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This week, we are informed, is ‘make or break’ for Theresa May’s 
Brexit withdrawal agreement. Assuming that nothing cataclysmic 
happens between now and Sunday – given the events of the last 
week anything seems possible – the heads of government from the 
remaining 27 EU countries will sign off the deal. Then, of course, 
there is the small matter of the withdrawal agreement being ratified by 
the UK Parliament. 
If logic and rationality were the guiding maxims in this process it would 
be reasonable to assume that everything will be in place for the UK’s 
‘departure’ from the EU on the 29th March next year. However, it’s 
worth remembering that from the outset what eventually became the 
EU was, in large part, based on the sentiment of creating a better 
Europe. 
The barbarity and brutality of the second world war was the catalyst 
among governments post-1945 in Europe to do everything possible to 
avoid repetition. Accordingly, in 1951 the Treaty of Paris led to the 
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which, 
ostensibly, was intended to assist countries recovering from war 
through economic cooperation. The underlying belief being that such 
cooperation would cement solidarity and integration that would ensure 
future conflict became much less likely. 
The UK’s entry in January 1973 to what was by then the EEC 
(European Economic Community), was based on economic logic. 
Being part of the trading group on its ‘doorstep’ offered considerable 
opportunity. However, sentiment associated with what is still referred 
to as ‘the special relationship’ with the US scuppered an initial attempt 
to join the EEC. 
In January 1963 France’s President Charles de Gaulle laid down what 
were regarded as impossible terms for the UK to join the EEC. 
President de Gaulle, whose antipathy towards the US resulted from 
resentment at US involvement in the retaking of France after D Day, 
was concerned that the UK would effectively be a ‘Trojan horse’ in 
allowing the US influence by proxy. As even 
Europhile Guardian remarked in a leader at the time, “In the last resort 
Britain is an Atlantic power before she is a European one, and her ties 
with the United States matter at least as much as her ties with 
Continental Europe.” 
That the UK persevered in its application to the EEC – helped by 
Georges Pompidou succeeding Charles de Gaulle as French 
president in 1969 – suggests that there was a time when the 
arguments concerning membership were driven by logic and the 
desire to be part of a future in which Europe was united by the goals 
of shared peace and prosperity. That these objectives, however 
imperfect, have been largely achieved should demonstrate the 
wisdom of being part of the EU; an organisation widely criticised and 
undoubtedly in need of reform. 
Since joining the EEC in 1973 just under 46 years, the UK has, at 
times, been perceived by other European countries to be not the most 
enthusiastic member. The fact that within 18 months a referendum on 
continued membership of the EEC in June 1975 had been held didn’t 
help. This referendum was the fulfilment of a Labour party manifesto 
in the February 1974 election to reconsider the terms of accession. 
Though the contemporary Labour party still contains divisions, in the 
early 1970s it contained many who vehemently argued that the EEC 
was far too overtly supportive of capitalism and British workers would 
suffer as a result of continuing to be a member. The outcome of the 
1975 referendum, in contrast to the more recent one in June 2016, did 
at least provide an unambiguous result of 67.23% voting yes to 
staying in the EEC compared to 32.77% voting out of a total of 
25,903,194 votes. 
The UK had voted overwhelmingly to remain a part of the EEC and 
business could concentrate on availing of the opportunities that would, 
its advocates had asserted during the referendum, make us all better 
off. Though Margaret Thatcher had her spats with Europe over 
budgets in the early 1980s, famously referred to having given the 
other leaders a ‘hand-bagging’, she remained wedded to the belief 
that continued membership was in the UK’s national interest. 
What stirred up the emotions of those within the Conservative party 
far more aggressively opposed to Europe than those in the Labour 
party was the what was seen as the desire by the EEC to create a 
more overtly political union. This objective, they argued, was 
demonstrated through enlargement on the basis of the Single 
European Act, signed by foreign ministers in February 1986 in 
Luxembourg and the Hague, followed by the Maastricht Treaty, 
agreed on 10 December 1991 and which came into force on 1 
November 1993. 
Maastricht, in particular, became the touchstone for Eurosceptics due 
to what was seen as the objective of creating an effective United 
States of Europe in the for of the European Union. The sentiment 
among Eurosceptics was that Maastricht showed that remaining a 
member of the Europe Union (EU) would initially undermine and 
eventually destroy British sovereignty. The premiership of John Major, 
who’d replaced Margaret Thatcher in November 1990 after she had 
been challenged by uber Europhile, now Lord Heseltine, was 
characterised by the machinations of the increasingly vocal and 
daring cabal of Eurosceptics; many of whom are still active to this day. 
The activities of the Eurosceptics caused David Cameron to call the 
referendum of June 2016 to, it was assumed at the time, show that 
the public dd not support with them in the way that Prime Minister 
Wilson had achieved back in 1975. Unfortunately, Cameron’s belief in 
his previous experience in public relations backfired and, as Theresa 
May knows to her cost, the scars of Brexit will not heal easily. 
The deal that is currently on offer by Theresa May offers, it appears, 
the most effective compromise that will protect the rational interests of 
business – who are increasingly exasperated at what they see 
occurring as a result of Brexit resulting in intense uncertainty – whilst 
addressing the sentiments of those in who consider themselves to 
have been disadvantaged by the free movement of labour. On this 
basis Theresa May deserves to be supported and the deal that has 
been achieved supported by politicians of all persuasions. 
Nonetheless, it seems, nothing short of a ‘no deal’ Brexit, likely to 
induce economic chaos, will slake the thirst of those who an aide of 
Cameron famously referred to as “swivel eyed loons” and are fuelled 
by their that this is essential to allow the UK’s to once again control its 
own destiny and economic affairs. As May’s enemies happily 
proclaim, any price is worth paying to be free of the EU which has 
slowly but surely strangled the UK through regulations written by 
faceless and unelected bureaucrats in Brussels. 
If no deal is indeed the outcome of the Brexit process then the worst 
excesses of irrational sentiment will have triumphed over the logic of 
economic rationality and what is expedient for the present and future 
generations. As a consequence, there will be a terrible legacy from 
our decision to rescind our membership of an organisation that was 
originally created to achieve peace and prosperity. 
 
